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WAIVER OF LIABILITY CLAUSES FOR PERSONAL
INJURIES IN RAILROAD FREE PASSES
Lunsford v. Cleveland Union Terminals Co.
170 Ohio St. 349, 165 N.E.2d 3 (1960)
Plaintiff brought an action against the Cleveland Union Terminals
Company for injuries received as she was thrown from an escalator which
was carrying her from track level to the main concourse of the depot,
charging the defendant with negligent operation of the escalator. The
defendant interposed as a defense a waiver of liability clause that appeared
in a free pass issued by the New York Central Railroad System to the
plaintiff and under which she travelled, alleging that the coverage of this
exculpatory provision should extend to the benefit of the defendant. The
terminal company provided the only station facilities for the New York
Central Railroad in Cleveland.' The Ohio Supreme Court affirmed judgment
for the defendant, holding that the waiver of liability clause was a complete
defense to the Terminal Company's alleged negligence.2
The problem presented in this case is the validity of the waiver of
liability provision contained in the free pass and whether or not such waiver
should be interpreted to include within its benefits the terminal facility used
by the railroad. The traditional rule is that one party may not contract
away liability for his negligence prior to the occurrence of the negligent
act.3 A modification of this rule was evidenced in a 1904 United States
Supreme Court decision by which a passenger was denied recovery on the
basis of an exculpatory clause contained in a free pass.4 Further qualification
I Upon reaching West 28th Street in the City of Cleveland, the New York Central
train transporting the plaintiff entered upon the right-of-way of the Cleveland Union
Terminals Company, travelling the remaining distance to the station on these tracks. Luns-
ford v. Cleveland Union Terminals Co., 170 Ohio St. 349, 165 N.E.2d 3 (1960).
2 Lunsford v. Cleveland Union Terminals Co., supra note 1. The free pass read in
part: "In consideration of receiving this free pass, each of the persons named thereon,
using the same, voluntarily assumes all risk of accidents and expressly agrees that the
company shall not be liable under any circumstances, whether of negligence of itself, its
agents, or otherwise, for any injury to his or her person . .. ."
3 12 Am. Jur. "Contracts" § 183 (1938), "Undoubtedly, agreements exempting persons
from liability for its own negligence induce want of care, for the highest incentive to the
exercise of due care rests in a consciousness that a failure in this respect will fix liability
to make full compensation for any injury resulting. It has therefor been declared to be a
good doctrine that no person may contract against his own negligence. . . ." Such was
deemed strictly applicable with regard to railroads and other common carriers which
engage in daily intercourse with society and which are charged with a high degree of public
responsibility. See also, Cleveland, P. & A. R.R. v. Curran, 19 Ohio St. 1 (1869); 8 Ohio
Jur. 2d "Carriers" § 223 (1954), and 11 Ohio Jur. 2d "Contracts" § 101 (1955).
4 Northern Pac. Ry. v. Adams, 192 U.S. 440 (1904). "If he had desired to hold it to
its common law obligations to him as a passenger, he could have paid his own fare and
compelled the company to receive and carry him. . . .It was a contract which neither
party was bound to enter into, and yet one which each was at liberty to make, and no
public policy was violated thereby."
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of the orthodox view arose as a result of judicial interpretation of the
Hepburn Act.5 A series of decisions have held that a waiver of liability clause
contained within a free pass is a valid defense to an action for negligence by
one injured during a portion of the trip covered by such pass. 6
Under the "waiver-immunity" doctrine of the Supreme Court of the
United States, the problem as to the scope of the coverage of such passes
still remains as the fulcrum of decision in the instant case. This can be a
delicate decision. 7 Inasmuch as numerous fact determinations must be made
prior to the adjudication of any individual case, it must suffice to display in
the analysis below the primary considerations for resolution of these disputes.
In the instant case, the pass under which the plaintiff travelled was
headed "New York Central System" and read in part as follows: "... volun-
tarily assumes all risk of accidents and expressly agrees that the company
shall not be liable under any circumstances. . . ." Two cases, decided prior
to the instant case, stand as the leading sources of analysis in this field.
In Wilder v. Pennsylvania R.R.,8 a liberal interpretation of the provisions
of the free pass involved resulted in the plaintiff being precluded from
recovery for injuries received, since she had expressly "assumed all risk of
accident" under the pass. The decision emphasized that the pass was
headed "Pennsylvania System" and held that the terminal was to be
considered a part of the system due to its close identity with the operation
of the railroad in that locality. Thus, in the absence of restrictive words in
the pass to show an intent to delimit liability, this court extended the
protective coverage of the pass to include a connecting carrier.
The gratuitous pass was given a more strict construction in Parker v.
Bissonette9 where the court looked directly to the wording of the pass. The
5 34 Stat. 584 (1906), 49 U.S.C. § 1(7) (1958) which states in part: "No common
carrier subject to the provisions of this part shall ... directly or indirectly, issue or give
any interstate free tickets, free passes, or free transportation for passage, except to its
employees ... and the families of any of the foregoing." The plaintiff in the instant case
was the wife of an employee of a railroad.
6 Kansas City So. Ry. v. Van Zant, 260 U.S. 459 (1923); Charleston and Western
Carolina Ry. v. Thompson, 234 U.S. 576 (1914); Spanable v. New York Cent. R.R., 80
Ohio App. 50, 69 N.E.2d 441 (1946). It is to be noted that the decisions of the federal
courts are controlling upon the state courts as to clauses in a free pass which exempt the
interstate carrier from liability for ordinary negligence. It is acknowledged, moreover, that
an interstate carrier could not protect itself from liability even under a waiver of liability
provision for wilful or wanton negligence. Donnelly v. Southern Pac. Co., 18 Cal. App.
2d 863, 118 P.2d 465 (Sup. Ct. 1941).
7 The problem arises from the language of the pass itself and the nature and
means of transportation provided under the pass.
8 Wilder v. Pennsylvania R.R., 245 N.Y. 36, 156 N.E. 88 (1927). The pass stated in
part: "I hereby assume all risk of personal injuries . . . and release the company from
liability therefor." The plaintiff was injured in a station owned by the Pennsylvania
Tunnel and Terminal Railroad Company while waiting to board a train of the railroad
which issued the free pass. Recovery was denied.
9 Parker v. Bissonette, 203 S.C. 155, 26 S.E.2d 497 (1943). The pass read in part:
"The person accepting this free ticket agrees that the Atlantic Coast Line Railroad shall
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reference to waiver of liability was directed specifically to the Atlantic
Coast Line Railroad, not to "the company."'0 Due to the explicitness
of the pass in referring to the railroad by name, there was no evidence that
the exculpatory clause was to benefit a third party, and immunity was not
extended to include a party that stood apart from the railroad.1
The Wilder case demonstrates that while the language of the pass is to
be considered, the nature and means of transportation involved is to be a
factor contributing to the final decision. This opinion stresses that a rail-
road pass applies to such stations and depots as are necessary in transporting
the passenger to the destination for which the pass is provided. Thus, a
connecting carrier over whose tracks the passenger must travel in order to
reach the terminal point established by the pass is to benefit under the
waiver of liability provision, provided that the language of the pass itself is
not so restrictive as to negative a broad construction. 2
The validity and breadth of coverage to be given an exculpatory clause
contained in a free pass also revolves around several policy considerations.
The initial argument to be resolved is the validity of the waiver of liability
clause. Traditionally, freedom to contract has not been extended as an
absolute right to a public service enterprise. 13 A waiver of liability clause
provided the public service enterprise with a defense to its own negligence
and thereby undermined the duty that it owed to the recipients of its
services. This theory was generated by the inequality of bargaining power,
characteristic of transactions between a private individual and an economic
giant upon whom the individual was dependent for certain services. It was
feared that this dependency would force one in need of the service to accept
the exculpatory clause or be deprived of the service altogether. This position
is not tenable in cases involving a waiver of liability provision in a railroad
free pass. The passenger is not a victim of economic coercion. He has equal
bargaining strength with the railroad company and is presented with the
option of accepting free travel with a deprivation of any right against the
not be liable under any circumstances, whether of negligence of agents or otherwise
... " The suit was against a busline operator who had a contract with the railroad to
carry the latter's passengers from a station on the outskirts of the city to a downtown
central area. Recovery was granted.
10 The circuit judge in the Parker case held that the stipulation of exemption should
run to the benefit of all who participated in the transportation of the passenger. On appeal,
this contention was reversed. The court then urged that the pass did not provide for the
passenger to assume all risks, as in the Wilder case. It merely stipulated that the Atlantic
Coast Line Railroad should not be liable.
11 In the instant case, the plaintiff assumed all risks of accident and agreed that the
company should not be liable under a pass headed "New York Central System." It would
seem judicious in the light and background of the Wilder and Parker cases to extend cover-
age of the exculpatory clause in the free pass so as to include the .Cleveland Union
Terminals Company within the meaning of the "New York Central System."
12 This factor was not expressly commented upon in the Parker case inasmuch as the
busline was not considered to be an independent common carrier.
13 The basis for the imposed restrictions was that the public service, by societal
demand, had a greater duty of responsibility.
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carrier for ordinary negligence, or choosing to pay the established fare and
thereby being fully protected should such negligence result in injury.
The second consideration involves the argument as to whether the
exculpatory clause should be extended to the benefit of the terminal company.
The more harsh view attaches a strict interpretation to a waiver of liability
clause and extends coverage only to the entities specifically mentioned. It is
feared that any other analysis eventually would serve to exempt the terminal
company from any liability to all people. This reasoning is artificial and
does not consider the activities typical of railroad operations. To overlook
the functional approach to the law and the facts involved in favor of the
traditional and often archaic notions of the past is to reject the concept
that a railroad attempts to carry a passenger from the locale of embarkation
to that of debarkation.' 4 It is contemplated that, in the broad expanse of
travel facilities, terminal operations will be provided. Seeing that these
services are expected of the carrier and are an integral aspect of railroad
travel, one is compelled to argue that such terminal facilities should be
included within the scope of the waiver of liability clause. This rationale will
not open the door to the exemption from liability of a terminal company to
all people; it will only restrict exemption to those in this station or depot
for the purpose under which the free pass, and the waiver of liability clause
contained therein, was issued.
This decision by the Ohio Supreme Court is consistent with the law
and with the policy considerations which underlie the law. The use of the
facilities of the Cleveland Union Terminals Company was necessary to the
arrival of the plaintiff at the contemplated destination, there being no other
depot available to the New York Central System in the city. The terminal
company was an integral part of the New York Central System operation
and, by nature of the vital service that it rendered the railroad, should be
included within the protection of the waiver of liability clause.
14 It is not sound to argue that these points are restricted to the geographical areas
in which the passenger steps on and steps off of the train. The public would be loathe to
travel without facilities at the place of departure and destination by which they could
comfortably gain access to the central area of activity within the city.
